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Abstract—  The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  test  the 
relevance of considering private fixed transaction costs 
for  contract  design  of  Agri-Environmental  Schemes, 
when  transaction  costs  are  negatively  correlated  to 
marginal  compliance  costs.  In  order  to  do  so,  a 
principal-agent model of contract design under adverse 
selection,  including  fixed  private  transaction  costs,  is 
developed.  The  model  is  applied  to  the  design  of 
payments in  the Emilia Romagna region of Italy. The 
results show that fixed transaction costs in the range of 
those actually faced by farmers may significantly affect 
the  optimal  amount  of  environmental  good  to  be 
produced  by  each  farm  type.  In  some  cases,  fixed 
transaction costs can even reverse the standard insight 
that more of a public good should be produced when the 
cost of its provision is lower (countervailing incentives). 
The  results  call  for  a  higher  attention  to  private 
transaction  costs  in  the  design  of  agri-environmental 
contracts. 
Keywords—  Agri-environmental  schemes,  principal-
agent, countervailing incentives. 
I. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 
Agri-Environmental Schemes (AES) have represented a 
growing part of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 
Europe  and  are  still  a  major  part  of  rural  development 
programmes for  the period 2007-2013. Existing academic 
and administrative evaluation exercises raise doubts about 
the  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  such  schemes.  In 
particular,  they  emphasise  the  needs  of  improving  the 
adaptation of AES design to the costs of different types of 
farmers and to the environmental needs of each area [1,2]. 
Economic  research  has  dealt  with  this  issue  from 
different perspectives in recent years. Two promising areas 
of  research  are  contract  design  under  asymmetric 
information  and  transaction  costs  theory.  In  spite  of  the 
close connections between the two areas, these issues have 
rarely  been  considered  together.  Transaction  costs  theory 
focuses on the costs associated with economic transactions. 
In the field of (agri-) environmental policies, this translates 
mainly in estimating the amount of such costs from a public 
or  a  private  perspective  [3].  Contract  design  under 
asymmetric  information  deals  mainly  with  searching  for 
optimal contract design, taking into account agents’ rent due 
to  non-completely-informed  design  conditions  by  the 
principal [4]. 
The objective of this paper is to discuss the relevance of 
fixed private transaction costs in the design of AES contract 
mechanisms. 
The  paper  outline  is  as  follows:  a  short  overview  of 
transaction  cost  issues  linked  to  AES’s  is  provided  in 
section 2. A model of AES contracts including transaction 
costs is developed in section 3. In section 4, an example is 
provided  with  reference  to  empirical  data  from  Emilia 
Romagna  (Italy).  Finally,  some  further  discussion  is 
provided in section 5. 
 
II. OVERVIEW OF TRANSACTION COSTS IN 
AES’S AND CONTRACT DESIGN ISSUES 
Transaction  costs  have  been  defined  as  “the  costs  of 
running  the  economic  system”  [5].  They  include 
information, negotiation, monitoring and enforcement costs. 
Public transaction costs have been widely studied in the 
specific  field  of  AES  (see,  for  example,  [6,7,8]).  Private 
transaction  costs  have  been  much  less  studied  (or  have 
received  much  less  attention).  They  may  include  the 
information  gathered  to  decide  about  the  contract  and  its 
characteristics,  payments  to  consultants,  extra  labour 
required  (for  example  for  paperwork  and  recording), 
administrative costs connected to the contract, etc. In many 
cases transaction costs are even difficult to define, as they 
may  include  subjective  attitudes  towards  particular  tasks 
(e.g. paperwork), risk perception or expectations. 
In  a  recent  report,  Mettepenningen  et  al.  [9]  analyse 
private  transaction  costs  produced  by  AES’s  in  10  case 
study areas in Europe. They find that transaction costs are in 
the range of 0-10% of compliance costs in most countries, 
with an average of 5,4%. However, in some cases they may 
reach up to 100% of the compliance costs. 
One major issue where modelling is concerned, are the 
economic  characteristics  (and  mathematical  forms)  to  be   2 
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attributed  to  transaction  costs,  with  respect  to  their 
fixity/variability.  It  may  be  expected  that  some  share  of 
transaction costs are fixed costs with respect to the payment 
or  to  the  area  involved.  For  example,  some  costs  of 
negotiation, information, and design of policy measures do 
not change with the size of the AES contract. On the other 
hand, there may be costs that are proportional to the amount 
of  payments.  In  most  cases,  transaction  costs  may  be 
assumed to grow less than proportionally with the increase 
of land devoted to the scheme, or to the budget, as the result 
of  the  combination  of  a  fixed  and  a  variable  component. 
The  fixed  component  is  likely  the  most  relevant,  when 
transaction  costs  are  mainly  or  solely  represented  by  the 
cost of drawing up a contract, and there is no project cost 
proportional to the land area involved. The expectation that 
a large part of transaction costs are fixed costs is shared by 
the literature [10], and corroborated by empirical evidence. 
For  example,  Mettepenningen  et  al.  [9]  found  that  total 
transaction costs per hectare decrease when the area under 
contract increases. 
 
III.  THE MODEL 
The use of principal-agent models to deal with contract 
design has gained growing attention in recent decades [11]. 
A number of cases have been analysed in the literature on 
the  subject  of  AES’s,  assuming  asymmetric  information 
with  either  adverse  selection,  moral  hazard  or  both 
[4,12,13,14,15,16]. 
Most  of  them,  however,  do  not  explicitly  take  into 
account  the  issue  of  private  transaction  costs  and  their 
consequences  on  contract  design.  In  the  present  paper, 
transaction costs are explicitly considered in the form of a 
fixed  (with  respect  to  the  provision  of  the  public  good) 
private  cost  connected  to  the  participation  in  the 
environmental  scheme.  Such  cost,  denoted  by  i   ,  is 
differentiated according to farm type. 
The application refers to the problem of adverse selection 
without  moral  hazard.  The  model  is  designed  following 
mainly Moxey et al. [4], with some slight modifications. 
The  setting  is  that  of  a  regulator  willing  to  induce 
farmers  to  produce  some  public  good  purely  competitive 
with  farming  activities.  In  order  to  do  so,  the  regulator 
offers  the  farmers  a  menu  of  contracts  which  include 
different  combinations  of  payment  and  required  levels  of 
production of a given environmental good. We assume the 
existence  of  two  farm  types  (i=1,2)  with  different 
productivity and, as a consequence, a different cost for the 
provision of competitive public goods. Farm type 1 is more 
efficient  in producing the environmental goods, and farm 
type  2  is  less  efficient.  We  assume  that  the  farms’  cost 
function for the provision of the public good c(.) is convex 
with  c’(.)>0  and  c’’(.)>0.  We  also  assume  that  the 
environmental benefit is linear with respect to the amount of 
the public good produced. 
Fixed transaction costs are added to the reservation utility 
arising from alternatives to the acceptance of the contract, 
and are assumed to be differentiated across farmers. In case 
of  two  types,  if  transaction  costs  are  higher  for  the  least 
efficient farm, it can be shown that the payments must be 
increased, but the contract design does not change [11]. 
However, a frequently reasonable assumption is that the 
farm that is more efficient in producing the environmental 
good  also  encounters  higher  transaction  costs  (i.e.  fixed 
private transaction costs and marginal compliance costs are 
negatively  correlated).  Throughout  the  paper,  we  assume 
that the reservation utility is zero, while  i    is zero for farm 
type 2, and is strictly positive for farm type 1. 
In the second best problem with mechanism design, the 
maximisation problem facing the regulator may be written 
as: 
 
max:  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
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s.t. 
PC1:  ( ) 0 1 1 1 1        
a a a c b       (2) 
PC2:  ( ) 0 2 2 2    
a a a c b       (3) 
IC1:  ( ) ( )
a a a a a c b a c b 2 1 2 1 1 1             (4) 
IC2:  ( ) ( )
a a a a a c b a c b 1 2 1 2 2 2             (5) 
 
Where: 
zi = objective function of the decision maker related to 
farmer i; 
bi = payment to farmer i; 
ai = amount of environmental good produced by farmer i; 
ci = costs for the provision of the environmental good by 
farmer i; 
e = shadow cost of public funds due to the distortionary 
effect of taxation; 
0
i U  = reservation utility of the agent if he refuses the 
contract. 
    =  subjective  prior  probability  that  the  regulator 
assigns to the farm being of type 1 (quantified, for example, 
on the basis of the total land expected to belong to farm type   3 
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1)  and  the  superscript  a  is  a  reminder  for  “asymmetric 
information”. 
IC, incentive constraints, ensure that each type of farm 
will find it profitable to choose the contract that is designed 
for it. 
The fixed transaction cost enters the regulator objective 
function  only  in  the  part  concerning  the  efficient  farm, 
because for the other farm type, it is assumed to be zero. For 
the same reason, it enters only the participation constraint of 
the efficient farmer. In the incentive constraints,     is not 
considered  as  it  cancels  out  for  the  efficient  farmer 
incentive constraint and is zero for the inefficient one. 
Of the four constraints, only the participation constraint 
of the less efficient (PC2), and the incentive constraint of 
the more efficient farm (IC1), are binding. In this case, the 
optimal  contract  design  produces  a  menu  of  contracts 
differentiated with respect to the farm type for which they 
are designed. 
When   =0 for both farms, for the more efficient farm, 
the optimum is given as in the first best: 
( ) ( ) v a c e
a = + 1
'
1 1       (6) 
Instead, for the less efficient farm, the optimal level of 
production of the environmental good is given as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] v a c a c e v a c e
a a a <  
 







          (7) 
The result is that the production of environmental good 
by the least efficient farm is lower in the second best case 
with respect to the first best. In addition, in this case, a rent 
is  gained  by  the  more  efficient  type.  This  is  a  relatively 
standard  result  of  contract  theory  with  adverse  selection. 
For more analytical details and demonstration, see [4]. 
When a positive fixed transaction cost is added for the 
most  efficient  farm,  the  results  change  depending  on  the 




The case in which: 
( ) ( )
a a a c a c 2 1 2 2 1   <         (8) 
In this case, only the participation constraint of the less 
efficient  (PC2)  and  the  incentive  constraint  of  the  most 
efficient farm (IC1) continue to be binding. The existence of 
a fixed transaction cost erodes the rent of the efficient farm 
type  and  the  value  of  the  regulator’s  objective  function. 
However,  it  is  irrelevant  for  the  determination  of  the 
optimal amount of the environmental good to be produced. 
When such a condition is satisfied, the optimal level of the 
environmental good provided and the related contract is the 




Case two occurs when: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
a a p p a c a c a c a c 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2   > >       (9) 
In this case, PC1 becomes binding and both PCs and the 
efficient  agent’s  IC  hold  with  equality.  As  a  result,  the 
amount of the public produced by the least efficient type is 
increases compared to case 1, while the contract structure is 
the same as in the first best for the more efficient type. This 
happens because maintaining the first best solution for the 
least efficient type would make the contract attractive for 
farm type 1. In other words, the principal can afford less 
distortion in the amount produced by the inefficient type. 
The  optimal  amount  of  the  environmental  good  is 
determined by: 





a a a c a c   =         (10) 
where a’ denotes the optimal second best solution in the 
cost range defined in (9). Clearly, the lower the difference 
between c1(.)and c2(.), the higher the change in a2, for the 
same amount of   . 
 
Case 3 
Case three arises when: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
p p p p a c a c a c a c 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2   > >       (11) 
In this case, the output of both farmers is at its first best. 
As long as IC2 is not binding,  the optimal solution  is  to 
contract the first best optimal level of environmental output 
for both farm types. The rent of farm type 1 is increased in 
order to compensate its transaction costs. 
 
Case 4 
This case arises when, growing   , the inefficient type’s 
incentive constraint becomes binding. We are in the range: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
p p CI CI a c a c a c a c 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2   > >       (12) 
where  CI  stands  for  countervailing  incentives.  The 
situation is somehow symmetric to case 2. At this stage, the 
inefficient  type  would  be  induced  to  choose  the  contract 
designed for the efficient type, unless  1 a  is increased. The 
amount 
p a2   does  not  change  compared  to  the  first  best, 
while  1 a  is now determined by: 
( ) ( )
CI CI a c a c 1 1 1 2 1   =         (13) 
 
The  efficient  type’s  contract  is  distorted  upwards  and 
incentives are inversed with respect to the usual model. This 
is the origin of the term ‘countervailing incentives’ [11,17].   4 
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Again, the lower the difference between c1(.)and c2(.), the 
higher the change in a1, for the same amount of    
 
Case 5 
When      further  increases,  the  situation  may  become 
completely reversed compared to the beginning, with: 
( ) ( )
CI CI a c a c 1 1 1 2 1   >         (14) 
 
When  (21)  is  true,  the  efficient  type  PC  and  the 
inefficient  type  IC  are  binding.  Maximising  the  objective 
function,  the  resulting  contract  shows  that 
p a2   does  not 
change  compared  to  the  first  best,  while 
CI a1   is  moved 
upwards compared to the first best and is determined by:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] v a c a c e v a c e
CI CI CI >  
 







        (15) 
 
IV. AN EXAMPLE 
The  model  is  tested  in  the  Municipality  of  Argenta, 
Emilia Romagna (Northern Italy). In the region, both reg. 
2078/92  and  reg.  1257/99  have  been  applied,  involving 
altogether about 15% of total usable farmland area. 
In  the  specific  area  of  the  Municipality  of  Argenta,  a 
particularly  important  measure  is  that  of  wetland 
restoration,  as  the  area  was  formerly  characterised  by 
extensive marsh and natural wetlands. In the 20th century 
most of the area was subject to land reclamation. Presently, 
the  reduced  importance  of  food  production,  and  the 
increased demand for recreation sites make recovering of 
traditional  biotopes  and  landscapes  a  priority.  Wetland 
restoration  was  already  funded  under  reg.  2078/92  and 
received further  support under reg. 1257/99. However,  in 
both cases, the uptake has been substantially unsatisfactory 
up to now. 
An  average  marginal  cost  function  for  land  diversion 
towards wetlands in the area has been estimated as: 
( ) a a a c 21 , 562 435 , 695
2 + =  
where: 
a (0 to 1) = share of land devoted to wetland by farm; 
( ) a c = average compliance cost. 
The  cost  function  has  been  derived  through  linear 
programming modelling of farmers’ behaviour in the area 
[18]. 
For  the  purpose  of  discussing  the  impact  of  fixed 
transaction  costs  on  contract  design,  the  diversification 
among  farms  is  a  critical  issue.  In  this  case,  it  has  been 
assumed  that  cost  functions  of  different  farms  may  be 
obtained as a fixed proportion of the average cost function, 
assuming  a  range  of  plus  or  minus  15%.  One  unknown 
parameter  is  the  value  of  the  environmental  good  to  be 
produced (v). For the purpose of this study, a value in the 
range of actual payments awarded up to now by AES’s in 
the area has been selected and set at 800 euro/ha. A further 
unknown parameter is the shadow cost of public funds. In 
this case, e=0,2 has been selected, as it is in the range of 
values that can be found in the literature [11,15]. 
With respect to     we perform a sensitivity analysis by 
computing the optimal contracts with opposite values of   : 
0,8 (likely close to the true value) and 0,2. 
As  the  value  of  fixed  transaction  costs  is  also  a 
particularly  variable  parameter,  we  opted  for  a 
parametrisation between reasonable values (0 to 90 euro/ha) 
that represents a percentage of the payment similar to those 
found in the literature, and discussed in section 2 (0-11%). 
Figure 1 shows the optimal contract solution for g=0,05, 
0,1 and 0,15, when   =0,8. 
   5 
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Figure n. 2 – Optimal amount of wetland (  =0,2)   6 
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Even  very  low  fixed  costs  affect  the  optimal  contract 
design.  The  impact  is  stronger  for  the  less  efficient  farm 
(see equation 14), where even a few euros per hectare affect 
the optimal amount of wetlands to be awarded. Results are 
more evident when g is lower. On the contrary, the amount 
of wetland to be awarded to the most efficient farm is rather 
stable due to the minor upward distortion as a result of the 
value of    (see equation 22). 
The opposite result arises when    =0,2, as in this case 
the amount of wetland to be awarded to the most efficient 
farm shows to be the most sensitive to the change in fixed 
transaction costs (figure 2). 
 
In  this  case,  the  efficient  farm  appears  more  directly 
affected  by  transaction  costs.  The  optimal  amount  of 
wetlands  allocated  to  the  most  efficient  farm  when  the 
transaction  costs  are  very  high  are  up  to  about  twice  the 
amount with    =0 when the case of g=0,15 is taken into 
account. 
Major  impacts  associated  with  transaction  costs  occur 
when      is  between  10  and  80  euro/ha,  which  is  in  the 
range of actual transaction costs in the area. In this case, it is 
interesting to note that the curves for farm type 1 intersect 
each other at different points. This means that, depending 
on the value of  transaction  costs,  lower  compliance costs 
may or may not imply a higher amount of environmental 
good  to  be  produced  by  the  most  efficient  farm.  For 
example, in the range of transaction costs between 20 and 
50 euro/ha, the amount of wetland to be produced is higher 
when g=0,10 than when g=0,15, even if, in the latter case, 
the cost of the provision of the public good is lower. 
 
V. DISCUSSION 
This  paper  provides  an  analysis  and  an  empirical 
application  of  the  effect  of  fixed  transaction  costs  on 
optimal contract design for agri-environmental policy, when 
transaction  costs  are  negatively  correlated  to  marginal 
compliance costs. 
The fact that fixed transaction costs could affect the way 
contracts are designed is known from the literature, and is 
confirmed by the empirical findings of this paper. 
The main finding of this paper is that fixed transaction 
costs  in  the  range  of  actual  transaction  costs  for  a  given 
farm may even have a strong affect on the optimal contract 
design. In some cases transaction costs can even reverse the 
intuitive  result  that  more  of  a  public  good  should  be 
produced when the cost of provision is lower. 
When the share of efficient farms is higher, the contracts 
aimed  at  the  least  efficient  type  is  more  affected  by 
transaction costs, and this occurs for relatively low levels of 
transaction  costs.  When  the  share  of  efficient  farms  is 
lower, the most efficient farm’s contract is more affected by 
transaction  costs,  and  the  impact  is  extended  to  a  wider 
range of the value of transaction costs. 
This result confirms the need for more focused research 
in  two  directions.  First,  the  structure  and  economic 
properties of transaction costs should be better scrutinised, 
in order to achieve a better understanding of their role in 
decision  making  by  farmers.  Second,  the  interaction 
between transaction costs and contract design needs to be 
better  understood  in  order  to  ensure  higher  empirical 
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